

LATVIA IN THE PLANS AND ACTIONS OF POLISH DIPLOMACY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION IN 1920–1932

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For Poland, Latvia was an important factor in the Polish foreign policy related to the plans of setting up a Baltic Union and joined actions in fights and negotiations with Soviets. The issue of Latvia in the plans and actions of Poland was closely related with other Baltic States. Unfortunately, none of the efforts, apart from the Moscow protocol, proved entirely successful for both sides. Polish diplomacy often lacked determination and activity towards the problems of relations with Moscow. Finally, it was the Soviet Union that succeeded in torpedoing Polish plans related to Latvia and the rest of the Baltic States.

Key words: Polish-Latvian relations, Polish diplomacy, Polish foreign policy, non-aggression pact, Moscow protocol.

RECOGNITION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF LATVIA

Polish policy towards Latvia and the Baltic States was shaped mainly by Józef Piłsudski, Head of State in the Republic of Poland during 1918–1922. The Baltic States, Latvia in particular, constituted an additional guarantee for Poland against the Soviet Union. For Poland, Latvia was an important factor in the Polish foreign policy related to the plans of setting up a Baltic Union and joined actions in fights and negotiations with Soviets. In addition, Latvia could have been an important anti-German and anti-Lithuanian ally for Poland.

On 22 October 1919, the day when Poland recognized the independence of Latvia, Józef Piłsudski said: “[..] an independent existence [of Latvia] is in the crucial and obvious interests of the Polish state.”¹ These were frank and truthful words, resulting mainly from the geopolitical situation of Poland and from the fact that the independence of both states was threatened. Poland, however, had recognized Latvia *de facto* but distanced itself from recognizing it *de iure*. The Polish attitude was caused by, among other things, the lack of recognition by the Entente states. In July 1920, the Polish government expressed its willingness to recognize Latvia *de iure*, in return for a military alliance, but it was impossible to enter such an alliance. Latvia, however, insisted on the *de iure* recognition and Poland decided to do it in 1921. Nevertheless the act was accompanied by many blunders and unnecessary diplomatic frictions. At the end of January 1921, the Polish envoy to Riga Witold Kamieniecki wrote to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as follows: “[..] to avoid a catastrophe of not recognizing Latvia by Poland as the only state, I have decided to recognize Latvia *de iure* contrary to my instructions to the Ministry and on my own responsibility I have asked Minister Wasilewski to do the same in the case of Estonia. We dated the recognition acts on 31 December last year.”² Unfortunately, the inside story leaked out to the press and this led to other antagonisms.

MEETINGS, SETTLEMENTS, PLANS

In the autumn of 1919, Poland proposed a military convention to Latvia. It was supposed to form part of a bigger plan of political military defence alliance with all the states bordering on the Soviet Union, from Finland to Romania. In January 1920, a Polish-Latvian agreement was signed in Riga in order to conduct military operations against Bolsheviks. In March 1920, Poland invited representatives of Latvia, and also of Finland, to a conference held in Warsaw to work out joint actions against Soviets. Poles had prepared two projects of a military convention with

Latvia: one in case Latvia concluded a peace treaty with Bolshevik Russia and another providing joint political military actions with Poland. The conference with the Latvians ended in total failure.³

In the face of the offensive launched by Bolsheviks in the summer of 1920, an alliance with Latvia became more and more important for the Polish foreign policy. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered the Polish envoy to Riga, Witold Kamieniecki, to do “all his best efforts” to persuade Latvia to join Poland in the war against Bolsheviks. But this end was not achieved. Piotr Łossowski, the researcher of Polish-Latvian relations, sees a degree of negligence on the part of Poland as well as its lack of determination in seeking an alliance with Latvia. According to him, as the military situation of Poland in the war with Bolsheviks improved, Poland was treating Latvia with increased frigidity. But the Latvians were also to blame, because they (mainly Social Democrats) regarded Poland as an imperialistic state.⁴ An important moment was a meeting at Bulduri near Riga in August 1920 (after the Latvians concluded peace with Bolsheviks) of the representatives of Latvia, Poland and Finland. On 31 August 1920, a political agreement was signed regulating mutual relations of these states and talks were held about the idea of a Baltic Union and the need to conclude a military convention. In October 1920, a preliminary project of the military convention between Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Finland and the People’s Republic of Ukraine was drafted. The project was anti-Soviet and imposed on the signatory states the obligation of mutual assistance in the face of a Soviet aggression against any of the signatories. The project, however, remained in the planning.⁵

In 1921, Warsaw still tried to organise a joint conference of the Baltic States to develop a common policy towards Bolsheviks. In July 1921, a meeting was organised in Helsinki. And although the need for a common policy towards the Soviet Union was recognised, the Polish-Latvian relations remained at a stalemate. An attempt to overcome this impasse was made by Polish Foreign Minister Konstanty Skirmunt. He planned to conclude military defence conventions (against Soviets) with all the Baltic

States. And to this end the Polish envoy to Riga Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz was working at the end of 1921. His mission brought about a small improvement in the relations between Poland and Latvia, and the latter accepted an invitation to a conference held in March 1922 in Warsaw. The conference was organised as preliminary consultations of Poland and the Baltic States to agree on a common position towards Soviet Russia before the upcoming Genoa conference. Poland hoped to set up the Baltic Union as a multilateral alliance. On 17 March, a political defence agreement was signed regulating actions of the signatories in case of unprovoked aggression of Russia, such as not to conclude any alliance against each other and to resolve conflicts only by peaceful means. The agreement, however, was not implemented because Finland refused to ratify it (the signatory states were bound by the principle of unanimity).⁶

The next meeting of the delegates from Poland, Latvia and Estonia, but also the Soviet Russia took place in Riga on 29 and 30 March 1922. The major concern was security matters of Central Europe. This was related to the problem of official recognition of the USSR by those states. The Soviet delegation confirmed peace treaties with Poland and other Baltic States. The final protocol signed by Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz, Chief of the Soviet Diplomacy Georgy Chicherin and foreign ministers of Estonia Ants Piip and Latvia Zigfrīds Meierovics included statements on the need of cooperation and coordination of actions by these states at the Conference of Genoa, the need of peace and arms reduction, the pursuit of peace and peaceful settlement of disputes. The fact that Poland had signed this document led to controversies in the Polish *Sejm* in April 1922, and Jodko-Narkiewicz was accused of “going too far”.⁷ Poland was right to fear Soviet interference into Polish relations with the Baltic States and hampering of the plans to set up a Baltic Union. In any case, as soon as in June 1922 Moscow suggested to Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Finland a conference on mutual and proportional disarmament. Being afraid of a defensive alliance of Poland and the Baltic States, Soviets proposed a regional disarmament agreement. The Moscow Conference was

held on 2–12 December 1922 and, apart from representatives of the USSR and Poland, was attended by diplomats from Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Romania and Lithuania. Already during the preliminary talks (before the conference started), and then during the conference, Poland and the Baltic States decided that any future agreement on arms reduction had to be preceded by the conclusion of non-aggression pacts between the Soviet Union and the states attending the conference. Soviets did not want to agree to this, so no agreement was made. In his report of this conference the chief of the Eastern Office Waclaw Jędrzejewicz wrote: “The Latvian delegation’s attitude was probably closest to the Polish one []. All the preliminary talks on the non-aggression pact were in fact conducted by the Latvian delegation alone, showing their good understanding of the issue. Only when the text of the pact was under discussion, the initiative went into Polish hands, with a strong support of Latvia.”⁸ The Moscow Conference became an important sign for the Polish diplomacy in the efforts to keep a unity front with Latvia and other Baltic States towards the Soviet Union. The idea to conclude a non-aggression pact in the form of a common regional agreement would become one of the most important elements in the Polish diplomacy towards the Baltic States and the USSR. At the same time, Poland was still negotiating the Baltic Union with the Baltic States. The Polish diplomacy tried to rescue the project of the Baltic Union as late as in 1925. And although in January 1925 a convention on conciliation and arbitration was signed, it was practically without any importance.

POLISH MEMORANDUM ON POLISH-SOVIET-BALTIC MATTERS AT THE END OF APRIL 1926

The memorandum was worked out by the Political Department of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At that time, the Department was headed by Juliusz Łukasiewicz, and Aleksander Skrzyński was foreign minister and prime minister. The document indicates that Polish diplomacy considered Soviet desire to conclude bilateral pacts and not multilateral, as suggested by

the Polish and Latvian diplomats at the Moscow Conference, an attempt to create a rival system to the League of Nations. This Soviet desire was perceived by the Poles as Soviet imperial plans threatening the independence of Poland and the Baltic States. The memorandum also indicates the danger resulting from the Soviet-German non-aggression and neutrality treaty concluded on 24 April 1926 and Soviet-Lithuanian talks on a guarantee pact (signed finally on 28 September 1926), but above all on the necessity of joint actions of Poland and the Baltic States towards Moscow. In the document we read that it would be necessary to “formally regulate the mutual relations between Poland and the Baltic States as an essential part of peace in North Eastern Europe. The Polish Government is willing to conclude a treaty with the Baltic States, which would be one of the guarantees of their existence and would become a foundation of peace based on the permanence of borders and political relations of these states with the Soviet Union.”⁹ To probe the attitude of the Baltic States, the head of the Eastern Office of the Foreign Ministry Stanisław Janikowski went to Riga, Tallinn and Helsinki at the end of April 1926. In the autumn of 1926, Poland, wanting to improve its relations with Latvia, sent its envoy Juliusz Łukasiewicz. Supported by Minister of Military Affairs Józef Piłsudski, and from 2 October 1926 to 27 June 1928, also Prime Minister, and the new Foreign Minister August Zaleski, he held numerous meetings and negotiations with the Latvians for three years.¹⁰

The knowledge of Polish decision-makers and diplomats of the inter-war period about the purposes of Soviet and German foreign policy was pretty broad and deep. It was the threat of these states that determined the course of Polish foreign policy and Polish alliances after the regaining of independence, i. e. alliances with France and Romania. The internal position of Poland, however, worsened after the decision of Locarno Conference of October 1925, and differences of opinion about the security in Europe between the East and the West of Europe, as well as after the Soviet-German non-aggression pact and neutrality pact of 24 April 1926. The treaty, a continuation of Rapallo policy, was

a dangerous signal for Europe basing its security on the League of Nations. Additional factors worrying Polish diplomacy were its analyses of the Soviet foreign policy which allowed for an assumption that by bilateral alliances the Soviet Union sought to create a new international system, competitive with the League of Nations.¹¹ Aleksander Skrzyński, who until 5 May 1926 was the prime minister and foreign minister, advocated a joint European action based on the procedures of the League to countercheck imperial aspirations of Soviet Russia. He thought that only organised Europe would be able to stand up to Moscow. After the coup of 12–14 May 1926, by Marshal Józef Piłsudski, there were some important changes in Polish foreign policy. The existing alliances were supplemented by a new political line, known in historiography as the policy of balance between the Soviet Union and Germany.¹² After May 1926, Józef Piłsudski became minister of military affairs, and from 2 October 1926 to 27 June 1928, he also served as prime minister (keeping the command of the army at the same time); and although the post of foreign minister in 1926–1932 was given to August Zaleski, it was the Marshal himself who, being an expert on Russian matters, had the greatest impact on the eastern policy of Poland. Even though Piłsudski appreciated the role of the League of Nations, he did not believe, just like Skrzyński himself, in the efficiency of its procedures that would guarantee the safety of Poland. In the autumn of 1926, the Marshal appointed his personal friend Stanisław Patek Polish envoy to Moscow and entrusted him with the task to negotiate a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. In his reports Patek presented some extremely interesting information and observations on the subject of the Soviet state. He wrote with bitterness that “the Russians are unable to unlearn looking at us like limotrophes who have broken away from Great Russia”¹³ and indicated that “there was no one who has been all the better for approaching the USSR without reservations and due caution. It is possible to realise the country’s aims only when they are afraid of or dependent on another country at the given moment, or are in need of something”.¹⁴

THE NON-AGGRESSION PACT

The idea of a non-aggression pact, without its detailed provisions, was presented to the Polish side already in November 1924 by the Soviet plenipotentiary representative (*polpred*), to Warsaw Pyotr Voykov.¹⁵ In January 1925, Poland proposed that the negotiations be joined by Romania and the Baltic States without Lithuania (Poland and Lithuania did not have diplomatic relations).¹⁶ Poland entered the negotiations with the Soviet Union on the non-aggression pact in 1926. Initially, the talks were led by the Polish envoy to Moscow Stanisław Kętrzyński. Poland conditioned the conclusion of negotiations on a joint pact of the USSR, Poland and the Baltic States (a round table formula) with an additional Bessarabian clause,¹⁷ but allowed for the possibility of concluding “individual alliances by Soviet Russia with Poland and the Baltic States” regarded as a whole.¹⁸ Moscow, seeking to conclude bilateral alliances with Poland and the Baltic States, consistently rejected the Polish condition.

At the beginning of 1927 the Polish side treated Soviet proposals with reserve and expected quick negotiations on the non-aggression pact. After Kętrzyński was recalled, a new envoy in the person of Stanisław Patek was sent to Moscow in January 1927. It was not until April that the negotiations with Soviets began. In June the talks were suspended after the assassination in Warsaw of Soviet *polpred* Pyotr Voykov. They were resumed for a short while in September of that year then suspended until the summer of 1931. Moscow did not accept the Polish suggestions to sign jointly together with the Baltic States and possibly Romania a multilateral pact at a round table.

When the negotiations were resumed in 1931, the Polish side still tried to maintain its position on the cooperation with the Baltic States and Romania as regards either the simultaneous signing of the pact or its initialling. Polish diplomacy doubled its efforts to encourage the Baltic States, Finland and Romania to sign pacts with the USSR.¹⁹ The Soviet side, however, prevented the Polish suggestion of cooperation with the Baltic States from

being realised and initiated separate negotiations with each of them that were concluded with the signing of pacts. In this situation, on 25 January 1932, Poland initiated the agreement with Soviets and on 25 July 1932, put its signature under it. In November 1932, the pact was supplemented by another important point on a formal conciliatory procedure. The Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact was made for three years, and in 1935 it was prolonged for another ten years.

THE MOSCOW PROTOCOL

A multilateral agreement on eliminating war as an instrument of national policy, called the Kellogg-Briand Pact or the Pact of Paris, was signed on 27 August 1928 in Paris, by Germany, the United States, Belgium, France, Great Britain and the British dominions, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. It entered into force on 25 July 1929. Already on 25 August 1928, France invited officially the USSR to enter the pact and on 6 September Moscow joined the signatories. The signing of the pact, regardless of its real or intentional significance, was an important element of the contemporary international relations. And this fact was used by the USSR. Let us remind here that the talks on the non-aggression pact between Poland and the Soviet Union were suspended in the autumn of 1927. On 20 December 1928, the Soviet Political Bureau decided to propose to Poland and Lithuania a protocol on “earlier ratification of the Kellogg Pact and on recognition of its entering into force between these states and the USSR regardless of its ratification by other signatories”.²⁰ It was Litvinov who talked about it with the Polish envoy to Moscow Stanisław Patek on 29 December 1928 in the presence of Boris Stomoniakov.²¹ The Soviet diplomat emphasised that the idea of earlier ratification did not include all the Baltic States because they had not joined the Kellogg-Briand Pact yet. But as soon as they would do it, Soviet Russia “reserves the right to turn”²² to Latvia, Estonia, and Finland in the future. The information was included in the note that Litvinov handed to Patek, together with

the suggestions that it was Poland who was responsible for the lack of tangible positive results from the negotiated non-aggression pact.²³ On the same day Litvinov informed the Lithuanian envoy to Moscow Jurgis Baltrušaitis about the initiated protocol and suggested that the pact should be turned into multilateral settlement for Moscow proposed to make it an open pact that could be joined by other states of the region. But the proposal did not stipulate the form of signing of the pact. Litvinov dispatched similar notes to the diplomatic envoys to Moscow of France, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. To Ambassador Herbet, he handed out a copy for Patek and asked him to pass on this information to the government of the United States.²⁴

The Soviet initiative was not favourable to Poland. The Turkish envoy to Moscow, Vasif Bey repeated to Litvinov a fairly characteristic comment of the Polish envoy Stanisław Patek who was supposed to say shortly after 29 December 1928, that “[..] if we say yes, we will be forced to cede the initiative to Soviets and recognise their contribution to this matter. If we say no, we will expose ourselves in the eyes of the world.”²⁵ Patek soon realized that this proposal made the USSR an arbiter of the region of Central Eastern Europe and saw it as an action that could be counter-productive to similar aspirations of Poland. Thus, he was rather critical of the suggestion of Moscow, although he did not oppose the idea of the pact itself. In his opinion it was a cunning diplomatic move of propaganda character to strengthen the Soviet position towards the neighbouring states. Patek thought that such an action could have a negative influence on the relations between Poland and the Baltic States. He wrote: “The theme had been cleverly thought out. Our consent to their proposals will bring them gain, and our refusal will give them grounds for a new attack of their self-advertisement and propaganda on the subject of their pacification and our belligerence.”²⁶ Also Ambassador Herbet saw the idea of Litvinov as a cunning manoeuvre to move Poland away from the Baltic States and to give the USSR the opportunity to take over the initiative in this region.²⁷

On 10 January 1929, Polish Foreign Minister August Zaleski gave Litvinov a positive reply to his note of 29 December 1928, on the condition that the Soviet government should issue similar notes to Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Romania.²⁸ Let us remind that the USSR had sent to the Baltic States only telegrams and not notes with the information about the content of talks with Poland and Lithuania. Thus, Zaleski wrote that because of “the necessity to deal jointly with the problem of security in Eastern Europe by all interested states,” the Polish government was going to address those states in order to examine their stance on the matter.²⁹ Indeed, the Polish side made proposals to agree and submit a common standpoint towards the Soviet initiative. In the light of Patek’s talks in the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs it is evident how the Polish diplomacy tried to use the Soviet proposals for its own ends and to extricate itself from the Soviet trap. Proposing the formula of signing the pact together with the Baltic States and Romania, the Poles returned to one of the thornier issues concerning the non-aggression pact.

At this time, the Lithuanian government (on 23 January) responded to the Soviet proposal by withdrawing from the participation because of, as it was stated, the necessity to sign the pact “on equal terms with Poland” and Polish aspirations to dominate in the Baltic region.³⁰ Finland was not interested in signing the protocol either. They explained that the Finnish parliament had to approve the Kellogg-Briand Pact first, and then possibly the protocol proposed by the USSR. This left, apart from the Soviet Union and Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Romania. And although initially Moscow opposed the formula to signing the pact together with the Baltic States and Romania (and let us again remind that there were no diplomatic relations established between both states), it finally consented to the proposal.³¹ There was, however, some friction, as Patek wrote to the then Undersecretary of State Alfred Wysocki on 29 January 1929: “As regards the matter of joint and simultaneous signing of the protocol by Poland, Romania and the Baltic States, the Soviet press took such a negative

position, and during my few last visits to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov was overcome with such strong bitterness that [...] I feared that Soviets might in their annoyance, ruthlessness and adventurism announce to the world that the negotiations are aborted and that our stance is anti-peace and anti-Soviet."³² Indeed, the days preceding the signing of the protocol were extremely nervous. Litvinov wanted to quickly sign the protocol with Poland only, he even set the date on 7 February 1929, and then he wanted other states to join in. Patek on the other hand, wanting to include the Baltic States and Romania, tried to delay the very act of signing, and suggested 10 February.³³ The Soviet diplomat made efforts to sign the protocol in the smallest possible group. For this reason, after the Romanian diplomat Carol Davila arrived to Moscow, Litvinov wanted the protocol to be signed by Romania and Poland only. According to him, neither Estonia nor Latvia responded officially to the proposal of joining the protocol, thus their diplomatic representatives had no authority to do it. Patek was against the idea.³⁴ After Estonian envoy Julius Seliamaa had been informed by his government that he could sign the protocol,³⁵ Litvinov tried to finalise the matter at least without Latvia.

Finally, thanks to extreme determination of the Polish side, but also the ambitions of Litvinov who was preparing himself to replace Chicherin as the head of the Soviet diplomacy, the protocol, called the Litvinov Protocol or Moscow Protocol, was signed on 9 February 1929, by the USSR, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Romania. The signatories were: Estonian envoy to Moscow Julius Seliamaa, Latvian envoy to Moscow Kārlis Ozols, Romanian envoy to Warsaw Carol Davila, Stanisław Patek and Maxim Litvinov. The protocol was a regional agreement on renunciation of war among its signatories and remained "open for all states to join in" (article 5).³⁶ Soon, the protocol was joined by Turkey and Persia, and then also by Lithuania, but was not joined by Finland.

CONCLUSIONS

The years 1920–1932 make an important period for the Polish-Latvian relations because of the attempts made by both countries to tighten the bonds between them and work out an effective policy towards the Soviet Union. The problem of Latvia in plans and actions of Poland was closely related with other Baltic States. Unfortunately, none of the efforts, apart from the Moscow protocol, proved entirely successful for both sides. Despite some satisfactory meetings and agreements, there was mutual lack of trust resulting from the fact that the Latvians suspected the Poles of hegemonic aspirations and the desire to keep Latgale, while the Poles suspected the Latvians of being in conspiracy with the Lithuanians. Polish diplomacy often lacked determination and activity towards the problems of relations with Moscow. Finally, it was the Soviet Union that succeeded in torpedoing Polish plans related to Latvia and the rest of the Baltic States.

I propose to divide the period between 1920 and 1932 into the following sub-periods: 1) 1920–1921 – attempts to persuade Latvia and other Baltic States to conduct joint military operations and negotiations with the Soviets, and attempts to set up a Baltic Union; 2) 1921–1925 – a continuation of the attempts to establish the Baltic Union and Soviet efforts to torpedo them; 3) 1925–1932 – an incorporation of plans of an alliance with Latvia and other Baltic States into the negotiations with the Soviet Union on a non-aggression pact.

To the period of 1920–1921 I would also add what has been ascertained by the outstanding expert in the Polish-Latvian relations Ēriks Jēkabsons. I agree with him that from 1919 onwards the two states found themselves in an extremely complex chain of events and processes occurring in the Baltic region, which resulted in shaping their boundaries and that the period had a decisive impact on the interwar years.³⁷

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- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 394, p. 664; doc. no. 395, p. 646; doc. no. 396, pp. 647–649; doc. no. 397, p. 649. See also: Materski. *Tarcza Europy*, pp. 223, 224; Herbet's telegram no. 1408 to Briand (29.12.1928.). *Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères français* (hereafter: *AMAEF*), URSS, vol. 311.
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LATVIJA POLIJAS DIPLOMĀTIJAS PLĀNOS UN RĪCĪBĀ ATTIECĪBĀ UZ PADOMJU SAVIENĪBU (1920–1932)

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Zinātniskās intereses: 20. gadsimta politiskā vēsture, starptautiskās attiecības, Polijas diplomātija 20. gadsimtā.

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Starpkaru periodā Latvija bija nozīmīgs faktors Polijas ārpolitikā, kas bija saistīta ar plāniem izveidot Baltijas savienību un vienoties par kopīgu rīcību kaujās pret Padomju Savienību un sarunās ar to. Polijas plānos un rīcībā Latvijas jautājums bija cieši saistīts ar citām Baltijas valstīm. Diemžēl šie pūliņi, izņemot Maskavas protokola parakstīšanu, neizrādījās sevišķi veiksmīgi nevienai no abām pusēm. Attiecībās ar Maskavu Polijas diplomātijai nereti trūka apņēmības un aktīvas rīcības. Galu galā tā bija Padomju Savienība, kurai izdevās izjaukt Polijas plānus attiecībā uz Latviju un pārējām Baltijas valstīm.

Atslēgas vārdi: Polijas–Latvijas attiecības, Polijas diplomātija, Polijas ārpolitika, neuzbrukšanas līgums, Maskavas protokols.

Kopsavilkums

1920.–1932. gads ir nozīmīgs laikposms Polijas–Latvijas attiecībās, jo tieši šajos gados abas valstis centās nostiprināt saites starp tām un izstrādāt efektīvu politiku attiecībā uz Padomju Savienību. Polijas plānos un rīcībā Latvijas jautājums bija cieši saistīts ar citām Baltijas valstīm. Latvija bija nozīmīgs faktors Polijas ārpolitikā, kas bija saistīta

ar plāniem izveidot Baltijas savienību un vienoties par kopīgu rīcību kaujās pret Padomju Savienību un sarunās ar to.

1919. gada rudenī Polija piedāvāja Latvijai noslēgt militāru līgumu. Tam vajadzēja veidot daļu no lielāka plāna nodibināt politiski militāras aizsardzības aliansi, kas aptvertu visas Padomju Savienības robežvalstis no Somijas līdz Rumānijai. 1920. gada janvārī Rīgā tika parakstīta Polijas–Latvijas vienošanās par kopīgām militāram operācijām pret boļševikiem. 1920. gada martā Polija uzaicināja Latvijas, Somijas un Igaunijas pārstāvjus uz konferenci Varšavā, lai izstrādātu kopīgu rīcības plānu attiecībās ar Padomju Savienību. 1921. gadā Varšava vēl joprojām mēģināja noorganizēt kopīgu Baltijas valstu konferenci, lai izstrādātu pret boļševikiem vērstu vienotu politiku. 1921. gada jūlijā tika noorganizēta sanāksme Helsinkos. Un, lai gan vārdos tika atzīta nepieciešamība pēc kopīgas politikas attiecībās ar Padomju Savienību, Polijas–Latvijas attiecības joprojām palika strupceļā. Izeju no tā pūlējās atrast toreizējais Polijas ārlietu ministrs Konstantijs Skirmunts. Viņš plānoja noslēgt militārās aizsardzības līgumu ar visām Baltijas valstīm. 1921. gada beigās šo mērķi tiecās sasniegt arī poļu sūtnis Rīgā Vitolds Jodko-Narkevičs. Viņa centieni nedaudz uzlaboja Polijas un Latvijas attiecības, un Latvija pieņēma ielūgumu uz konferenci Varšavā 1922. gada martā. Konference tika organizēta kā iepriekšējas sarunas starp Poliju un Baltijas valstīm, lai pirms gaidāmās Dženovas konferences vienotos par kopīgu nostāju attiecībās ar Padomju Savienību. Polija cerēja izveidot Baltijas savienību kā daudzpusēju aliansi. 17. martā tika parakstīts politisks aizsardzības līgums, kas noteica signatārvalstu rīcību gadījumā, ja Krievija sāktu neizprovocētu agresiju; tas paredzēja, piemēram, neslēgt aliansi citai pret citu ar trešajām valstīm un konfliktus risināt tikai ar mierīgiem līdzekļiem. Tomēr šis līgums nestājās spēkā, jo Somija atteicās to ratificēt (signatārvalstis saistīja vienprātības princips). Nākamā Polijas, Latvijas, Igaunijas un arī Padomju Savienības delegātu tikšanās notika 1929. gada 29. un 30. martā Rīgā. Galvenais sarunu temats bija Centrāleiropas drošība. Tas bija saistīts ar šo valstu oficiālo PSRS atzīšanas problēmu. Padomju delegācija ratificēja miera līgumu ar Poliju un pārējām Baltijas valstīm. Polija gluži pamatoti baidījās, ka Padomju Savienība iesaistīs tās attiecībās ar Baltijas valstīm un kavēs plānu izveidot Baltijas savienību. Jebkurā gadījumā jau 1922. gada jūnijā Maskava ierosināja Polijai, Latvijai, Igaunijai un Somijai sasaukt konferenci par savstar-

pēju un proporcionālu atbruņošanās. Nobijusies no Polijas un Baltijas valstu iespējamās aizsardzības alianses, Padomju Savienība ierosināja noslēgt reģionālu atbruņošanās līgumu. Maskavas konference notika 1922. gada 2.–12. decembrī, un to apmeklēja ne vien PSRS un Polijas, bet arī Igaunijas, Latvijas, Somijas un Lietuvas diplomāti. Jau iepriekšējās sarunās (pirms konferences sākuma) un arī konferences laikā Polija un Baltijas valstis nolēma, ka pirms visiem nākotnē plānotajiem bruņojuma samazināšanas līgumiem jānoslēdz neuzbrukšanas līgumi starp Padomju Savienību un pārējām konferences dalībvalstīm. Padomju Savienības pārstāvji negribēja tam piekrist, tāpēc līgums netika noslēgts. Nākotnē šī ideja par neuzbrukšanas līgumu kopīgas reģionālas vienošanās formā kļuva par vienu no svarīgākajām sastāvdaļām Polijas attiecībās ar Baltijas valstīm un Padomju Savienību. Tajā pašā laikā Polija vēl aizvien veda sarunas ar Baltijas valstīm par Baltijas savienības izveidošanu. Šo Baltijas savienības izveides projektu Polija mēģināja glābt pat vēl 1925. gadā. Un, lai gan 1925. gada janvārī tika parakstīts samierināšanās un arbitrāžas līgums, tam nebija gandrīz nekādas praktiskas nozīmes. Diemžēl neviens no šiem pasākumiem, izņemot Maskavas protokolu, neizrādījās pilnīgi veiksmīgs abām pusēm. Neraugoties uz dažām apmierinošām sanāksmēm un noslēgtiem līgumiem, trūka savstarpējas uzticēšanās, kas izskaidrojams ar faktu, ka latvieši turēja poļus aizdomās par hegemonistiskām tieksmēm un vēlmi paturēt sev Latgali, savukārt poļi turēja latviešus aizdomās par sazvērestību ar Lietuvu. Diemžēl Polijas diplomātijai bieži vien trūka apņēmības un aktīvas nostājas pret sarežģījumiem attiecībās ar Maskavu. Galu galā tā bija Padomju Savienība, kurai izdevās izjaukt Polijas plānus attiecībā uz Latviju un pārējām Baltijas valstīm.